T Nation

The Fighting Season


#1

http://www.directv.com/premiums/audience/thefightingseason

I just happened to catch this show when it came out. All I can say is it's truly well done and worth watching.
They take you in depth into the Afghan War and it's truly eye opening. The rules of engagement change put in place by obama has truly put our soldiers lives at some much greater risk. They cannot fire on a bad guy unless fired upon, they cannot take out direct threats, they are so much greater risk than before. This show really shows you that. S1 E1 takes you into a fire fight where you can see the danger of these rules of engagement front and center and shows the danger the troops face because they face an enemy that has no rules, yet they are bound by a litany of red tape.

Here is more information on the change to the rules of engagement put in place by the obama administration.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/5/increase-in-battlefield-deaths-linked-to-new-rules/?page=all

https://storify.com/littlebytesnews/rules-of-engagement-under-the-obama-administration

These rules our killing our troops, literally. This show, shows the absurdity of these rules and what it's doing to our troops. It's just a stupid way to fight a war.

Anybody else see it? What do you think?


#2

I dont need to watch a show to know that the roe’s imposed by a pussy liberal are putting our sons and daughters at risk.

I also dont have directv so i cant watch, but i would love to see this available on uverse.


#3

This shit’s been going on for a LONG time. I thought they’d learn by now. Maybe Varq remembers this: they got slaughtered in Lebanon in the 80’s because they were on guard duty at a barracks and were not allowed to have live rounds in their weapons. Terrorists were taking pot shots at them daily and they couldn’t fight back, then they all got taken out. It was a tragedy.

Same thing happened to the French, but the French killed the guy before he rammed his truck into the barracks building. They had ammo in their guns. Hell, the Russians got threatened and parked a Druse tank in font of their embassy, because the Commies didn’t mess around back then. They knew how to project force to intimidate their enemies.


#4

The ROE you refer to were implemented by general military officers as a keystone of counterinsurgency doctrine, not by senior civilian policy makers.

Karl W. Eikenberry is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command?Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge . . . Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: ?Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources” . . . When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy . . . The first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily."

In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.


#5

[quote]Bismark wrote:
The ROE you refer to were implemented by general military officers as a keystone of counterinsurgency doctrine, not by senior civilian policy makers.

Karl W. Eikenberry is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command?Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge . . . Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: ?Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources” . . . When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy . . . The first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily."

In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.[/quote]

It’s a small comfort to those in harms way, to have bullets wiz by their head before they can act in taking out a known enemy fully present in their midst, who are also fully aware of, and taking advantage of the rules of engagement. The error is a fundamental one, treating it as a counter-insurgency which it is not. It is a war. Treating it as something other than that is dangerous, stupidly dangerous. And when you are suited up and carrying a rifle, and you have to wait for a known enemy to attack you first, you have to wonder how stupid the people are who are writing these documents. They care not for your life, their not even worried about theirs. What they are concerned about is their career. And they are playing games with the lives of those who are subject to their silly games. We are not in counter-insurgency mode, we are at war. Treating it as something other than that has cost many lives needlessly.


#6

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Bismark wrote:
The ROE you refer to were implemented by general military officers as a keystone of counterinsurgency doctrine, not by senior civilian policy makers.

Karl W. Eikenberry is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command?Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge . . . Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: ?Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources” . . . When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy . . . The first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily."

In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.[/quote]

It’s a small comfort to those in harms way, to have bullets wiz by their head before they can act in taking out a known enemy fully present in their midst, who are also fully aware of, and taking advantage of the rules of engagement. The error is a fundamental one, treating it as a counter-insurgency which it is not. It is a war. Treating it as something other than that is dangerous, stupidly dangerous. And when you are suited up and carrying a rifle, and you have to wait for a known enemy to attack you first, you have to wonder how stupid the people are who are writing these documents. They care not for your life, their not even worried about theirs. What they are concerned about is their career. And they are playing games with the lives of those who are subject to their silly games. We are not in counter-insurgency mode, we are at war. Treating it as something other than that has cost many lives needlessly.[/quote]

As Clausewitz pointed out, war is politics by others means. War is thus properly understood as a political condition. Insurgency is a form of war waged by belligerents who do not have international legal personality. Counterinsurgency is a strategic military doctrine that obviously aims to combat an insurgency. Succinctly, COIN entails “clear, hold, and build - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy.” It would be a fool’s errand to do so without regard for the civilian population, as the first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to “secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily.”


#7

Read James Rowe’s book “Five Years to Freedom”. He was an “advisor” to the South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam in 1963, ended up captured then went on to develop the SERE school curriculum. He was operating under the same ROE the “advisors” of today are. It was not the first COIN operation and those principals were began developing very early in the Cold War.

Bismark summarized the goals of COIN operations and the defense establishment is well aware and on record stating the more active role we play, especially in the Middle East, the more we are viewed as an “imperialist” force and are subject to subsequently greater enmity by individuals we need to win to our side.

It’s all a moot point given the current force posture in the Middle East and most of your articles are dated.


#8

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Bismark wrote:
The ROE you refer to were implemented by general military officers as a keystone of counterinsurgency doctrine, not by senior civilian policy makers.

Karl W. Eikenberry is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command?Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.

“Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge . . . Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: ?Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources” . . . When the Obama administration conducted a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, some military leaders, reinforced by some civilian analysts in influential think tanks, confidently pointed to Field Manual 3-24 as the authoritative playbook for success. When the president ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan at the end of that year, the military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of “clear, hold, and build” - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy . . . The first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily."

In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.[/quote]

It’s a small comfort to those in harms way, to have bullets wiz by their head before they can act in taking out a known enemy fully present in their midst, who are also fully aware of, and taking advantage of the rules of engagement. The error is a fundamental one, treating it as a counter-insurgency which it is not. It is a war. Treating it as something other than that is dangerous, stupidly dangerous. And when you are suited up and carrying a rifle, and you have to wait for a known enemy to attack you first, you have to wonder how stupid the people are who are writing these documents. They care not for your life, their not even worried about theirs. What they are concerned about is their career. And they are playing games with the lives of those who are subject to their silly games. We are not in counter-insurgency mode, we are at war. Treating it as something other than that has cost many lives needlessly.[/quote]

As Clausewitz pointed out, war is politics by others means. War is thus properly understood as a political condition. Insurgency is a form of war waged by belligerents who do not have international legal personality. Counterinsurgency is a strategic military doctrine that obviously aims to combat an insurgency. Succinctly, COIN entails “clear, hold, and build - in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy.” It would be a fool’s errand to do so without regard for the civilian population, as the first principle of COIN doctrine is the need to “secure the indigenous population in areas deemed centers of gravity politically, economically, and militarily.”[/quote]

I am not contesting what you said, I am saying that the policy, be it the way it is or not, is a stupid way to fight a war.
And despite what talking heads in the government want to call is, it is in fact still a war, not a counter insurgency.
I am further saying that the rules of engagement as they are, setup as rules for counter insurgency is dangerous for the soldiers there. Nobody told the taliban the war is over and they are now just insurgents. They are fighting a war, a cold blooded one at that.

No one is advocating for civilian casualties here. If however, you see an enemy combatant scoping your position, right in front of you, you should be able to take them out. These guys walk right up to the troops, get their position, and then report it to the militants hiding behind a wall, so they know exactly where to shoot. Our troups cannot fight back, until they have bullets wizzing past them (or through them). That’s the problem I have with the rules of engagement.
This show, does an incredible job of showing it. These guys embedded themselves with the troops in real fire fights.
It’s an eye opening point of view.


#9

You keep stating

“its a war, its a war, its a war”

Was it declared by Congress, as of course you know, wars have to be?

Yes it is a war in every sense of the word, but legally, it is not war;


#10

[quote]phala wrote:
You keep stating

“its a war, its a war, its a war”

Was it declared by Congress, as of course you know, wars have to be?

Yes it is a war in every sense of the word, but legally, it is not war; [/quote]

The AUMF, signed in to law 9/18/2001 gave the President to use military force on any nations or persons deemed to be involved with 9/11:
In brief - ‘IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.’

So yes, it was a legal war.


#11

no, its not;

that falls under military action just as your copy-paste said, which then falls under what biz stated above;

ie)

“In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.”


#12

[quote]phala wrote:
no, its not;

that falls under military action just as your copy-paste said, which then falls under what biz stated above;

ie)

“In addition to modern counterinsurgency doctrine, one must consider international law; specifically, jus in bello. Treaty law, international customary law, and general principles of international law place limitations on the use of force. (1) Military operations must be carried out of military necessity; (2) belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians; (3) and must be proportional, i.e., belligerents must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an operation against a legitimate military objective.”

[/quote]

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/sjres23/text

  1. SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

“Constitutionally, the 9-18-01 Act is a Declaration of War.”

"The AUMF is remarkable, even stunning, in its sweep. It accounts for and justifies nearly every military action in which the United States has engaged in the past ten years in fighting the war on terror. (Iraq was the subject of a separate, overlapping war-authorization. U.S. military action in Libya, as I will discuss, is not justified by the AUMF and is probably best classified as an unconstitutional war.)

Consider the AUMFâ??s expansive language. Congress declared war against not only enemy nationsâ??the traditional form of a war-declarationâ??but also against organizations and persons. The sole condition is that â??the President determinesâ?? that a nation, organization or person is connected, in any of a number of ways, to the attacks of September 11, 2001. This includes â??harboringâ?? any person or organization who the President determines â??planned, authorized,â?? orâ??the most open-ended termâ??even â??aidedâ?? the 9-11 attacks. "

So yes, that wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were both legal wars authorized by congress under S.J. Res. 23 and H.J.Res. 64 of the 107th Congress signed into law 9/18/2001.

The measure S.J. 23 passed the Senate with 98 - 0 voting in favor, with 2 not voting.
The measure H.J. 64 passed the House with 420 - 1 voting in favor, with 10 not voting.

Legal war.


#13

I see; Ill leave you guys to debate this then, i dont know anything about international law or the legal nonsense of our system;


#14

Many people are confused about ROEs. They in no way restrict self defense. Furthermore, the comment about “the wrong way to fight a war” should be modified to read “counterinsurgency, the wrong war to fight.”


#15

The legality of the fighting, war or no war, has nothing to do with how it is being fought which is at issue here.