Fuck them.
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Open carry is already illegal there. The court just ruled that outlawing all carrying is constitutional as long as itās done with 2 separate laws, lol. They are saying outlawing just concealed carry doesnāt violate the right to bare arms so the law is OK. Never mind it plus there other laws prevent all arms baring.
Itās completely asinine.
Going to be tough for it to fall at SCOTUS, because, if you read the opinion, the court basically used an originalist argument to come to its conclusion.
And Iām not attempting to take credit here, but this is what I have been crowing over in nearly every Second Amendment thread we have - there is an originalist argument that states can have restrictions, and courts are getting wise to it. This one did - thereās ample precedent that states could restrict concealed carry prior to and after the Fourteenth Amendment. There used to be a great deal of scorn for concealed carry, since the presumption is that you must be up to no good if youāre trying to hide your weapon before using it.
The self-proclaimed originalists on SCOTUS will have a hard time overcoming this conclusion.
Thatās all well and good in the originalist context of traditional open carry.
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Well while I was stating a hope I am not overly optimistic about it falling at this moment in time. I need to read into it deeper.
And as Double Duce says, all well and good if you have a view of open carry like you mention. However, California does notā¦quite the opposite.
Concerning the Militia
FEDERALIST 29
Independent Journal
Wednesday, January 9, 1788
[Alexander
Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York: THE power
of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of
insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending
the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that
uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended
with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the
public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of
the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment
in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the
degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their
usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the
regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is,
therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention
proposes to empower the Union āto provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively
the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by congress.ā
Of the different grounds which have been taken in
opposition to the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to
have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this
particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most
natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation
and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the
national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious
power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is
committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the
pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command
the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment
of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will
be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more
certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon
paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is
nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the
POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the
execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military force was
intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the
objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not
much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair
dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the
powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in
the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the
POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much
short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt,
that a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the
citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws,
as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for
the imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules
of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial
by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition
of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS
is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has
been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal
government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason
could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of
authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary?
What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in
this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican
jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the
hands of the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views
of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued
by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from
viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as
dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments
to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a
militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following
discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the
United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being
carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a
business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that
will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry,
and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of
going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary
to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of
a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious
public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the
present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of
the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would
abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be
unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not
long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the
people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to
see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or
twice in the course of a year."But though the scheme of disciplining the whole
nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of
the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be
adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the
government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps
of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in
case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an
excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the
defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for
military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to
the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if
at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to
defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me
the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best
possible security against it, if it should exist."Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed
Constitution should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety
from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition.
But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which
neither they nor I can foresee.There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in
the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial
of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to
instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political
fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What
shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of
their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments,
habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from
a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command
its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the
sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? If it were possible
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers
being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can
be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating
influence over the militia.In reading many of the publications against the
Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale
or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind
nothing but frightful and distorted shapes ā
āGorgons, hydras, and chimeras direā;
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and
improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling
for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky
to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in
militiamen instead of louis dāors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a
large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the
militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred
miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of
Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory
haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate
imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities
upon the people of America for infallible truths?If there should be an army to be made use of as the
engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army,
whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant
and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon
a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants,
who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in
their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just
vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers
stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by
exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations?
Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power,
calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and
execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning
patriots to a discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of
incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national
rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe
that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be
natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched
into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the
violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the
first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed,
a principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be
placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and
listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had
superadded the incitements of self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of
duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 46
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
New York Packet
Tuesday, January 29, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York: RESUMING
the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal
government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the
predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in
which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially
dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this
position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place.
The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees
of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different
purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the
people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these
different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as
uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of
each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be
told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides
in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative
ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of
them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the
other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should
be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common
constituents.Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former
occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural
attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States.
Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to
rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will
flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal
interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of
these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the
members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on
the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most
strongly to incline.
Experience speaks the same language in this case. The
federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what
may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst
the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and
importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever. It
was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the
protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that
could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably
found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that
the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own
particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of
popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and
importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their
political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people
should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State
governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible
proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent
propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from
giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but
even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because
it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of
things, be advantageously administered.The remaining points on which I propose to compare the
federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may
respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.It has been already proved that the members of the federal
will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter
will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the
people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State
governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each
towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must
clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view,
the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members
themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable
to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State
governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general
government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of
Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the
particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors
committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members
to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the
particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside.
And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective
welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make
the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its
government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same
reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach
themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal
legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The
States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures
will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the
national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and
pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the
spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal
of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a
seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently
displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of
impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper
sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the
federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a
hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views
of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the
new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the
existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as
confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake
sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of
the individual States, or the preorgatives of their governments. The motives on
the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations
from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions
in the members.
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may
feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond
the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of
defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly
to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not
too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately
and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The
opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers,
would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil
could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means
which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other
hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable
measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it
are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and,
perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the
executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative
devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any
State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very
serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States
happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal
government would hardly be willing to encounter.But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on
the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a
single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm.
Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be
opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and
conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an
apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke;
and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same
appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the
other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to
such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was
employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the
less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in
speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we
are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people
would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives
would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole
body of their common constituents on the side of the latter.The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall
of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal
government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of
ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to
little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of
this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of
time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the
traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue
some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the
governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold
the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be
prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a
counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.
Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army,
fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely
at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far
to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able
to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best
computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one
hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the
number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States,
an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be
opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their
common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their
affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus
circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.
Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this
country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility
of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over
the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate
governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers
are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe,
which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are
afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid
alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to
possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who
could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers
appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them
and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the
throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the
legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of
America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of
which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary
power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us
rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce
themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame
submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and
produce it.The argument under the present head may be put into a
very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which
the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently
dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be
restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their
constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of
the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State
governments, who will be supported by the people.On summing up the considerations stated in this and the
last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers
proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to
those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been
sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments,
must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears
of the authors of them.
PUBLIUS
I am going to drop an excellent and extremely well thought out article here. It is a reprint, but originally belongs to the University of Virgina Journal of Law. It is long but well cited and absolutely worth your time.
Looks like Iāve found what Iāll be doing with my down time tomorrowā¦ 
This is also a very good read.
http://www.constitution.org/2ll/2ndschol/89vand.pdf
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āThe problem that we have, and really the firewall that we have right now, is due process. Itās all due process. So we can all say we want the same thing, but how do we get there? ā¦ The shooter in Orlando was brought in twice by the FBI. They did everything they could ā¦ but there was no way for them to keep him on the NICS list or keep him off the gun buy list. So canāt we say if a personās under suspicion there should be a five-year period that we have to see good behavior [before they can buy a gun]? Maybe we can come to that kind of agreement. But due process is whatās killing us right now.ā
The words of a United States senator. Un-fucking-real. Didnāt he take an oath to uphold something?
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Utter fucking destructionā¦
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Get off my lawn !
Funny Max I was watching a video of Ben Stein who said that he is going to vote for Trump BECAUSE of the scum that attack the Trump supporters at rallies. Probably not the best reason to vote for someone. But given the corrupt Clinton machine that heās running against I suppose almost any reason to deny the āpants suitā a victory is a good one.
The reporter is my good buddy from.college, Danny Fulgencio! Heās an incorrigible lib, but a great guy. Crazy that this story got this big!
Thatās wild Cortes, I guess Trump protesters are equal opportunity haters.
Was that a left wing protestor beaning a left wing reporter?
Refreshing.
A Chicago journalist attempted to buy an āassault rifleā to demonstrate how easy it was for terrorists to obtain dangerous weapons, only to be left grasping for an explanation when the gun store denied him.
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