Iran Nuclear Deal

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
Textbook case of what Bismark is talking about when he cautions against listening to people who don’t know anything about foreign affairs:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:
I’m still wondering what we got out of this deal?[/quote]

Nothing. Not a damn thing. We got a promise that they will not try to make a bomb for 15 years.[/quote]

No. As I wrote a page ago (it has been slightly altered):

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
150 inspectors in the country, IAEA technical monitors and international scientists at Fordow, 98 percent reduction in uranium-stockpile size and a 3.67 percent cap on enrichment, late-generation centrifuges surrendered, Arak dispossessed of plutonium-production capacity, 25 years of IAEA monitoring of nuclear facilities. The 24 days entail some risk, particularly if the Iranians find a way to stall further, but, as Moniz said, this is not a matter of dishwashing (and the extant nuclear facilities themselves will not be subject to any delay: they will be monitored continuously). Nuclear weapons production is heavy industry, and an interested American security apparatus is a hell of a thing to try to hide from. Again, though, it is absolutely inarguable that the agreement effectively destroys Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear weapon for up to a quarter of a century (and, indeed, beyond: they aren’t going to get back much of what’s taken from them). There is no question about this. Perhaps we do go to war in 25, 40, 50 years; perhaps we don’t. Perhaps the Iranian regime and, more importantly, Iranian people get pushed beyond the tipping point and come to loudly say that American good will is preferable to the teeth of American military might. Perhaps. This is the nature of the game. If you want a sure thing, bet against the New York Jets.)[/quote]

^ A little bit more than “a promise” and/or “nothing.” [/quote]

We’ll see. The above will depend on transparency and enforcement. 150 inspectors in country is about 4,200 square miles per inspector, that’s about triple the size of Rhode Island. That’s a lot of ground to cover per person…
[/quote]

That’s an odd way of framing it. Inspections are not carried out by dividing the country into sections of territorial square footage and then assigning an inspector to each section so that he can wander around with a particle detector. The inspectors will largely be assigned to nuclear facilities, overseeing things like the Natanz enrichment cap and the surrender of stockpiles. Here also we bump into that word “trust,” which has been used incorrectly throughout this thread. As I have said a couple of times now, and even notwithstanding the undeclared-site inspections delay (which, for reasons given, entails less risk than the reactionary propaganda suggests), there is no question as to what the concrete terms of the deal (viz. stockpile reduction, enrichment cap, late-stage centrifuge shutdown and monitored storage, IR-40 conversion, plans for Fordow) do to Iran’s ability to break out to a nuclear weapon. And, being as they are concrete and verifiable with an inspections regime in place, it will be easy to know whether these concrete terms are being observed.

Put very simply, the deal makes it much more difficult for Iran to get the bomb for up to twenty-five years (and in fact beyond that, given the confiscations); it assures an enormous increase in Western intelligence (and military) agencies’ understanding of Iran’s nuclear program and facilities and vulnerabilities and historical progress; and it offers a concrete basis for aggressive sanctioning and/or multilateral war in case of Iranian noncompliance. Compared with the state of world affairs over the last few years, there is today – and this is not a controversial point – a far smaller chance that Iran will become a nuclear weapons state, and, were they to try, a far larger chance that we would be able to successfully and efficiently intervene.

As an aside I will make the unrelated and general point that if somebody readily admits ignorance of what the NPT is and does, his disposition in a nuclear-diplomacy debate should be “listening quietly” rather than “opining loudly.” This is what Bismark is talking about, and he’s dead right. Similarly, a person entirely and obviously ignorant of the tax code would do well to listen to Beans rather than twirl in circles, spraying nonsense in every direction.

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
. . . Obama - so desperate to get Congress on board - very publicly explained that it was this deal or a far worse alternative. [/quote]

The alternatives to the United States’ coercive diplomacy are war or containment, a daunting dilemma to say the least. Critics of the deal (the vast majority of whom hadn’t even bothered to read the text of the JCOPA before voicing their vehement opposition to it) have been unable to articulate cogent policy alternatives. The challenge in Iran policy (as is so often the case) lies not in picking an ideal course but in choosing among lesser evils. Diplomacy is preferable over containment, and containment over war.

As Robert Jervis writes, “The deal with Iran falls far short of what the United States and its European allies would like. Although the question of whether the West could have gotten a better deal is interesting, much more important is the question of whether the deal was better than the breakdown of the negotiations. It was, and by quite a large margin.” According to the senior RAND analyst Dalia Dassa Kaye, failure to reach a deal would likely have produced one or more of the following: an expanded Iranian nuclear program; an erosion of broad international sanctions without any benefit to regional or global security; heightened potential for military conflict; and the loss of opportunities to work on major areas of common concern to Iran and the United States.
[/quote]

Incorrect, according to the way you have framed it. Diplomacy doesn’t mean “this deal” - it means a deal, which would have many iterations or permutations other than the current one. There is not a choice between This Deal and War or the Status Quo, and there never has been. Well, there wasn’t up until Obama negotiated the deal unilaterally and, as a result, created material terms that set a floor below which Iran will not go in future negotiations.

Obama and the other nations had plenty of other diplomatic cards to play. Iran really, really, really wants sanctions lifted in the short-term - knowing that, why not negotiate scaled penalties for lower level malfeasance, which doesn’t include the birth of a nuclear weapon, but is surely to happen?

“Snap back” is a non-starter - countries that have begun to establish deeper commercial relationships (which they want desperately) are unlikely to engage in that for Iran’s misdeeds. Scalable penalties needed to be part of any deal, but the agreement in left toothless in this space.

There was plenty of additional thing to get from Iran through diplomacy. It wasn’t achieved. That was a failure if diplomacy because it was a failure to negotiate from a place of strength to better secure international security.

With more time, a better deal could have been reached. We had leverage to get more out of Iran.

This canard of “This Deal or War” is and always has been a false choice and nothing more than a marketing strategy to impugn the motives of critics of the deal. Enough.

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
“Snap back” is a non-starter - countries that have begun to establish deeper commercial relationships (which they want desperately) are unlikely to engage in that for Iran’s misdeeds. Scalable penalties needed to be part of any deal, but the agreement in left toothless in this space.
[/quote]

This is a very important and astute observation thunderbolt. Once the money starts to flow Iran will gain a significant amount of leverage they current do not have.

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
“Snap back” is a non-starter - countries that have begun to establish deeper commercial relationships (which they want desperately) are unlikely to engage in that for Iran’s misdeeds. Scalable penalties needed to be part of any deal, but the agreement in left toothless in this space.
[/quote]

This is a very important and astute observation thunderbolt. Once the money starts to flow Iran will gain a significant amount of leverage they current do not have. [/quote]

And Iran well-knows it. “Snap back” would only occur if Iran birthed a bomb, but in which case all bets would be off anyway. What happens when we find out Iran starts funneling monies received from lifted sanctions to terror elements? “Snap back”? Of course not.

It’s a paper tiger.

Like China, Iran will grow rich, and with those new riches, will arm itself to the teeth. And the same naifs that were positive China would liberalize and become a peaceful, transitioned, less aggressive nation after establishing trade-diplomacy will have the same egg on their faces with Iran.

And to be crystal clear - I am for diplomacy. While I have sincere doubts about Iran’s willingness to adhere to any deal in good faith, I’ve always supported a diplomatic approach to securely interests.

But this isn’t a good deal, and a better one could have been had. One very large reason it is bad is because it was rushed, and completed before all the cards could effectively be played, and the reason it was rushed was because Obama is under a time crunch to get something, anything done before he leaves his office because of his desire for legacy. And the entire process was infected by that motivation, and it compromised a very good opportunity to work for a better deal.

Completely agree thunderbolt.

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
why not negotiate scaled penalties for lower level malfeasance, which doesn’t include the birth of a nuclear weapon, but is surely to happen?
[/quote]

This seems like a fair criticism. I tend not to dwell on how the negotiations were conducted because I don’t know how they were conducted: I don’t know what was said behind closed doors, which is surely more important than either regime’s domestic political rhetoric. I do know that governments do not take anything other governments say to their own people at face value: there are job opportunities in every country for analysts who are able to understand the domestic politics of foreign nations well enough to translate speeches and statements vis-a-vis motivation, political climate, etc. There is a division of a prominent private intelligence company that does this for Spain, so we can be assured that we and the Iranians are reading between every line. I would also suggest that it is never far from anybody’s mind, in terms of high-stakes negotiations, that the U.S. occupies an ultimate position of definitional strength. The general and well-founded assessment is that the Iranian regime considers itself existentially threatened; we, on the other hand, would like to deal with the Iranian problem, but there is no chance of a burning White House in the near future. (Of course, to qualify my assessment, if the Iranians were reading between the lines, they too would have figured Obama to be in search of a secure legacy.)

All that aside, however, and accepting your criticism as legitimate, we have not arrived remotely close to the bumper-sticker rhetoric that the Right is pushing (and that has been on display on this very page): that we got nothing, and, much more importantly, that we’ve handed Iran the bomb. Missed opportunities or not, there is no interpretation of reality under which the terms of the deal fail to make extensive and positive (from our perspective) changes to Iran’s nuclear program, and verifiably so. This having been the overarching aim of the negotiations.

As you say, lower-level malfeasance, which does not include the birth of a nuclear weapon, is bound to happen. In light of the fact that it was higher-level malfeasance, which does include the birth of a nuclear weapon, that we were all thinking about a month ago, I find it difficult to share too much in the pessimism. In the end we’ll have to reconvene in 5-15 years and see where things stand.

Smh,

But it makes little sense to claim that “we really got a lot out of this deal” when the things we got - stockpile cuts, centrifuges, etc. - if we have no legitimate means of making sure we got the things we were told we would get. What we got is all predicated on hopes and trust of Iranian leaders.

That was my point about scalable penalties - what if we don’t catch Iran in a lab with a nuclear bomb, but they slow walk mothballing their facilities? What if Iran doesn’t cut its stockpile by 98%, but instead cuts it by 30%? What then? “Snap back” won’t occur. How did we insure we get what we “got” in negotiations?

What if they delay access to inspectors? What is the consequence?

Supporters can jaw all they want about verification, but this deal is dependent on our hopes that Iran complies because they will ultimately come around to thinking this is the right thing to do. Hogwash. Go get these great concessions but secure them with real enforcement options. Without them, celebrating how much we got from Iran is wasted exercise.

No one thinks we didn’t get anything from Iran on paper - the problem is these actual concessions will never actually materialize and we failed to make sure they would.

I’m for diplomacy - smart, tough diplomacy that, say, speaks softly and carries a big stick. This diplomacy is the opposite.

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
Textbook case of what Bismark is talking about when he cautions against listening to people who don’t know anything about foreign affairs:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:
I’m still wondering what we got out of this deal?[/quote]

Nothing. Not a damn thing. We got a promise that they will not try to make a bomb for 15 years.[/quote]

No. As I wrote a page ago (it has been slightly altered):

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
150 inspectors in the country, IAEA technical monitors and international scientists at Fordow, 98 percent reduction in uranium-stockpile size and a 3.67 percent cap on enrichment, late-generation centrifuges surrendered, Arak dispossessed of plutonium-production capacity, 25 years of IAEA monitoring of nuclear facilities. The 24 days entail some risk, particularly if the Iranians find a way to stall further, but, as Moniz said, this is not a matter of dishwashing (and the extant nuclear facilities themselves will not be subject to any delay: they will be monitored continuously). Nuclear weapons production is heavy industry, and an interested American security apparatus is a hell of a thing to try to hide from. Again, though, it is absolutely inarguable that the agreement effectively destroys Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear weapon for up to a quarter of a century (and, indeed, beyond: they aren’t going to get back much of what’s taken from them). There is no question about this. Perhaps we do go to war in 25, 40, 50 years; perhaps we don’t. Perhaps the Iranian regime and, more importantly, Iranian people get pushed beyond the tipping point and come to loudly say that American good will is preferable to the teeth of American military might. Perhaps. This is the nature of the game. If you want a sure thing, bet against the New York Jets.)[/quote]

^ A little bit more than “a promise” and/or “nothing.” [/quote]

We’ll see. The above will depend on transparency and enforcement. 150 inspectors in country is about 4,200 square miles per inspector, that’s about triple the size of Rhode Island. That’s a lot of ground to cover per person…

[/quote]

The IAEA has improved technologies that supplement inspections with real-time data. Electronic and fiber optic seals, laser sensors, smart cameras and encrypted networks allow inspectors to closely monitor Iran�??�??�?�¢??s nuclear infrastructure, in real time, from their command post in Vienna. This mitigates concerns regarding limited manpower and the 24 day inspection waiting period.

There also exists a virtuous circle between the IAEA and Western intelligence. If the US intelligence community, with its multiple agencies - utilizing spies, eavesdropping on communications, breaking coded messages - reveals problems, it can bring its intelligence on the matter to the IAEA. Obama can ease the concerns of Congress by increasing the funding for intelligence collection, analysis and target development on the Iranian nuclear program by as much as $ 1 billion a year, a small price to pay for a nuclear free Iran.

Inspections also bolster the intelligence community’s understanding of the Iranian nuclear program, greatly benefiting collection efforts and the accuracy of targeting packages. As Austin Long - a security policy expert that served in Iraq as an analyst and adviser to the Multinational Force Iraq and the U.S. military - writes, “From an intelligence perspective this [inspectors continuous monitoring of Iran’s nuclear supply chain] is an unparalleled opportunity to collect, analyze and develop targeting databases on this crucial element of Iran’s ability to reconstitute its nuclear program. A bombing campaign that effectively destroyed the centrifuge manufacturing base would cripple Iran’s ability to reconstitute for years, perhaps even a decade or more. This opportunity alone should make Iran hawks gleeful.”

The full article is required reading - for proponents and detractors of the deal alike.

“If you really want to bomb Iran, take the deal”

[/quote]

Oh I feel better about it now. The IAEA has better technology, so it’s all good. Iran is going to stop sponsoring terrorism, release our prisoners, allow gay marriage, and revoke sharia law because the IAEA has better technology. It’s all good now.[/quote]

I never argued the straw man above. Care to address the rest of my post, and specifically the virtuous circle of inspectors and Western intelligence? The article I linked puts forth a compelling argument why even Iran hawks should be for a deal.[/quote]

The subtleties of hyperbole are lost on you I see.

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
There is a division of a prominent private intelligence company that does this for Spain[/quote]

(off topic) Could you provide some details? A link, perhaps?

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Bismark wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Bismark wrote:
A better deal is an illusion. If the United States rejects the JCPOA, its policy vis-a-vis Iran will be limited to a daunting dilemma: war or containment. I prefer an imperfect deal (an ideal deal is an irresponsible fantasy) to either surgical strikes against Iran’s nuclear program or containment, though the latter is preferable to the former.

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/iran-deal-rejection-121257.html#.Vc4V8PlViko[/quote]

Then ‘no deal’ would be the better option. An imperfect deal is a better option in this case. [/quote]

Your first and second sentences are logically incompatible. Can you be so kind as to clarify? [/quote]

EDIT:
Then ‘no deal’ would be the better option. An imperfect deal is a worse option in this case.[/quote]

How so? Did you follow the author’s reasoning? [/quote]

I just disagree with it. The deal does more to limit our options. We have to abide by it, while Iran has the option to walk away from it at many points. I disagree that we are out of options as it pertains to curbing their nuclear capabilities. I disagree that it removes the possibility of military strikes against Iran. That may very well happen anyway for other reasons in the following years. I did not see where they agreed to abandon Hezbollah or Hamas. They are perfectly well capable of carrying out hostile attacks that have nothing to do with nuclear technology and thus would not fall under the constraints of the agreement. We do not know what they are going to do. If they were a trustworthy partner, we would have had diplomatic relations with them a long time ago. It’s silly to believe that now they are trustworthy without any evidence.
This deal gives them the ability to be a financial and military powerhouse in the ME where under current pressure they could not be. We have to remember who Iran is and not simply have tunnel vision when it comes to their nuclear program.

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:

[quote]usmccds423 wrote:

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
“Snap back” is a non-starter - countries that have begun to establish deeper commercial relationships (which they want desperately) are unlikely to engage in that for Iran’s misdeeds. Scalable penalties needed to be part of any deal, but the agreement in left toothless in this space.
[/quote]

This is a very important and astute observation thunderbolt. Once the money starts to flow Iran will gain a significant amount of leverage they current do not have. [/quote]

And Iran well-knows it. “Snap back” would only occur if Iran birthed a bomb, but in which case all bets would be off anyway. What happens when we find out Iran starts funneling monies received from lifted sanctions to terror elements? “Snap back”? Of course not.

It’s a paper tiger.

Like China, Iran will grow rich, and with those new riches, will arm itself to the teeth. And the same naifs that were positive China would liberalize and become a peaceful, transitioned, less aggressive nation after establishing trade-diplomacy will have the same egg on their faces with Iran.
[/quote]

I agree. Also, as I previously stated if the ‘snap-back’ would occur even with friendly nations you are affecting two economies now, not just Iran. Save for the most egregious offences will a partner nation, presuming they are making serious money with Iran trade deals, are going to agree to snap back anything. Who’s going to be willing to negatively impact their own economy if for instance, Iran stores a ton more of Uranium than agreed or decides to enrich at 4% instead of 3.75%, or manufactures ‘a bit’ of plutonium? Small violations will not inspire our partner nations to agree to a sanctions snap-back, if it affects them. But small violations can add up over time.
And if it’s China or Russia, nothing short of a blockade will stop them.

Ron Paul said it best , “it is our best chance we won’t attack Iran”

[quote]angry chicken wrote:

We are giving them 150 BILLION dollars that they can use any way they want. Rice admits that it’s possible (read: probable) that Iran will use some of the money to fund it’s military and “the kinds of ‘bad behavior’ (read: TERRORISM) that we have seen in the region up until now”.

WE HAVE JUST FUNDED TERRORISM

OBAMA and KERRY SHOULD BE TRIED FOR TREASON

Treason, as defined in Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution is: “… shall consist of only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort…”

Does anyone dispute that giving IRAN, the lead sponsor of terrorism IN THE WORLD who’s citizens chant “death to America” in their streets - giving them ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS, could only be considered “aid and comfort”? I mean, what the fuck are people thinking? Can anyone dispute that they are our enemy? Can anyone dispute that 150 BILLION dollars might give them “aid” and “comfort”? WTF!!![/quote]

You are spot on. I will only add that for 150 billion Obama could have at least freed the four hostages that Iran still holds.

Obama is a disgrace!

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
Smh,

But it makes little sense to claim that “we really got a lot out of this deal” when the things we got - stockpile cuts, centrifuges, etc. - if we have no legitimate means of making sure we got the things we were told we would get.[/quote]

What does this mean? The confiscations, limitations, and conversions at Iranian nuclear facilities will be overseen by the IAEA (and, therefore, the CIA as well). Infrastructure under moratorium will be stored under continuous monitoring. What, in contradistinction, is a legitimate instrument of verification?

[quote]
That was my point about scalable penalties - what if we don’t catch Iran in a lab with a nuclear bomb, but they slow walk mothballing their facilities? What if Iran doesn’t cut its stockpile by 98%, but instead cuts it by 30%? What then? “Snap back” won’t occur. How did we insure we get what we “got” in negotiations?[/quote]

If it drags its feet, then either it will do so egregiously (the term used is “significantly”) enough that we will come up with an argument to the effect that Iran has failed to meet its commitments, in which case, if the dispute is not resolved to our satisfaction, any permanent member of the UNSC, including the alleging state, can unilaterally force the re-establishment of most sanctions (Iran would then argue that it is absolved of its obligations, the deal would dissolve, etc.)…or it will do so while still moving in the direction in which we want it moving – surrendering what it’s committed to surrender, converting what it’s committed to convert – in which case we have a less-happy-go-lucky-but-qualitatively-similar version of exactly what we want.

[quote]Vrednic wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
There is a division of a prominent private intelligence company that does this for Spain[/quote]

(off topic) Could you provide some details? A link, perhaps?
[/quote]

Not exactly what I was talking about (which specific program I will have to keep to myself in the interest of keeping my employment history as vaguely unidentifiable as possible), but I’m sure Stratfor does this kind of thing.

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
Smh,

But it makes little sense to claim that “we really got a lot out of this deal” when the things we got - stockpile cuts, centrifuges, etc. - if we have no legitimate means of making sure we got the things we were told we would get.[/quote]

What does this mean? The confiscations, limitations, and conversions at Iranian nuclear facilities will be overseen by the IAEA (and, therefore, the CIA as well). Infrastructure under moratorium will be stored under continuous monitoring. What, in contradistinction, is a legitimate instrument of verification?

[quote]
That was my point about scalable penalties - what if we don’t catch Iran in a lab with a nuclear bomb, but they slow walk mothballing their facilities? What if Iran doesn’t cut its stockpile by 98%, but instead cuts it by 30%? What then? “Snap back” won’t occur. How did we insure we get what we “got” in negotiations?[/quote]

If it drags its feet, then either it will do so egregiously (the term used is “significantly”) enough that we will come up with an argument to the effect that Iran has failed to meet its commitments, in which case, if the dispute is not resolved to our satisfaction, any permanent member of the UNSC, including the alleging state, can unilaterally force the re-establishment of most sanctions (Iran would then argue that it is absolved of its obligations, the deal would dissolve, etc.)…or it will do so while still moving in the direction in which we want it moving – surrendering what it’s committed to surrender, converting what it’s committed to convert – in which case we have a less-happy-go-lucky-but-qualitatively-similar version of exactly what we want.[/quote]

So, we really only have gone in a circle - the only penalty is the “snap back”, which won’t be used (and hard to think it was ever contemplated to be) outside of something egregious, which could be many things significant. As a result, gets a lot of room to obfuscate, to dodge, to intentionally come up short of the goals the agreement aspired to, and little reason to actually fear any punishment for doing so, especially after deep commercial ties are established with countries.

Thus the qualitative aims of the deal are predicated on “fingers crossed.”

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]thunderbolt23 wrote:
Smh,

But it makes little sense to claim that “we really got a lot out of this deal” when the things we got - stockpile cuts, centrifuges, etc. - if we have no legitimate means of making sure we got the things we were told we would get.[/quote]

What does this mean? The confiscations, limitations, and conversions at Iranian nuclear facilities will be overseen by the IAEA (and, therefore, the CIA as well). Infrastructure under moratorium will be stored under continuous monitoring. What, in contradistinction, is a legitimate instrument of verification?

[quote]
That was my point about scalable penalties - what if we don’t catch Iran in a lab with a nuclear bomb, but they slow walk mothballing their facilities? What if Iran doesn’t cut its stockpile by 98%, but instead cuts it by 30%? What then? “Snap back” won’t occur. How did we insure we get what we “got” in negotiations?[/quote]

If it drags its feet, then either it will do so egregiously (the term used is “significantly”) enough that we will come up with an argument to the effect that Iran has failed to meet its commitments, in which case, if the dispute is not resolved to our satisfaction, any permanent member of the UNSC, including the alleging state, can unilaterally force the re-establishment of most sanctions (Iran would then argue that it is absolved of its obligations, the deal would dissolve, etc.)…or it will do so while still moving in the direction in which we want it moving – surrendering what it’s committed to surrender, converting what it’s committed to convert – in which case we have a less-happy-go-lucky-but-qualitatively-similar version of exactly what we want.[/quote]

So, we really only have gone in a circle - the only penalty is the “snap back”, which won’t be used (and hard to think it was ever contemplated to be) outside of something egregious, which could be many things significant. As a result, gets a lot of room to obfuscate, to dodge, to intentionally come up short of the goals the agreement aspired to, and little reason to actually fear any punishment for doing so, especially after deep commercial ties are established with countries.[/quote]

Yes, we have gone in a circle: there is a legitimate verification process, and there is an instrument of punishment. You are arguing that the latter would have been better had it allowed for Iran to be punished for small-time malfeasance (not productive of a nuclear weapon*) with commensurate force under a tiered system. I agree: this would have been a better deal. However, this does not amount to the baffling claims that have been made again and again over the course of this thread – viz., no verification, no punishment, so it’s bad deal. We have reached an agreement under which we ease international economic pain on Iran in exchange for Iran’s complying with a laundry list of nuclear constraints under the technical supervision of monitors. If at any point we are for any reason unsatisfied with Iran’s progress in meeting its obligations under the terms of this agreement, we have the power to make an allegation and, if unsatisfied with the steps taken or not to resolve the complaint, to unilaterally return to it international economic pain. (In some ways, this is harsher than the alternative: we can, if we so choose, dangle the whole sword over their heads for any reason.) Of course, we have the power – and perhaps, in the event of a breakdown, the will – to do much more…a fact not lost on the Iranian leadership. There is a great deal more than “fingers crossed” entailed by this, at least inasmuch as any deal can be said not to rely on finger-crossing.


  • Again, though, it was large-scale malfeasance (productive of a nuclear weapon) we were talking about a month ago.

^ “Baffling claims…” – not necessarily made by you, TB. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I’m arguing against a narrative (and therefore for a counter-narrative) here. I haven’t been following closely enough from the beginning to cross my t’s and dot my i’s with regard to how the prevailing PWI narrative came to be.