I think this analysis from Stratfor captures my attitude fairly well: cautious optimism in the face of some successes. I like the trend, but we can’t let our guard down.
The Middle East and Murphy’s Law
By George Friedman
Recent events in the Middle East have created a growing sense of traction for the United States and ignited discussions about how events – such as the Syrian agreement to pull back its forces from Lebanon – have vindicated President George W. Bush’s foreign policies.
In many respects, this is justified – although given the extreme nature of the criticism of the Iraq invasion and other policies, vindication would be hard to avoid. It is interesting to note that the recent sense of euphoria has been made possible only because Bush’s critics have set such absurdly low expectations that anything short of catastrophic failure comes across as success.
It certainly is true that things in the Middle East are going better than they were – and much better than Bush critics thought they would – but that does not mean the challenges are past for the United States. The anti-jihadist war is not over, and neither is the Iraq campaign. There could be heavy fighting and troubling times still ahead, even if the trend line is positive for the United States.
Consider the situation in Iraq. The insurrection remains generally confined to the Sunni Triangle, and for now, the general pace of operations against U.S. forces has declined. But it is not clear whether the drop-off is related to declining support for the insurgency among the Sunni leadership or whether the guerrillas simply have slowed their operational tempo to regroup, recruit, train and recover. This is standard for any military force after an offensive, and the insurgents have done so before.
There is evidence – including the capture of a number of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s key aides – that the guerrillas have been militarily hurt and constrained, but that will not be certain until June or so, judging from past patterns of violence. Another question mark must be placed next to the fighting capabilities of the Shiite forces and whether the new Iraqi government has the will to commit them to the battle against the insurgents.
In the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the situation is more positive than at any time since the Oslo Accords. But it might be worth remembering that the Oslo Accords ended catastrophically, so that particular comparison might not be the most useful. Critical issues have not yet been addressed.
For example, it is not clear whether Hamas has undergone an ideological about-face and accepted the principle of Israel’s right to exist, or whether the group is simply too weak to challenge the peace process at the moment. It also is not apparent whether anyone has thought clearly about claims to Jerusalem. A settlement based on Palestinian weakness will work only if weakness leads to pliability, or if the weakness cannot be reversed.
There has been a favorable evolution of events in Lebanon, with Syria pledging to withdraw its occupation forces. However, it would be an enormous and highly questionable assumption to believe that either Hezbollah, whose very existence depends heavily on Syrian control of Lebanon, or the Assad regime, which has serious economic interests there, would simply follow the trend. Indeed, they already are taking steps to reverse or to slow it, with Hezbollah calling out hundreds of thousands of pro-Syrian demonstrators in Beirut and a pro-Syrian prime minister, Omar Karami, again forming a government. Neither Hezbollah nor the Assads are going to go quietly into that good night.
Finally, al Qaeda appears to have been broken. They are certainly not clearly operational anywhere – but betting against them is always dangerous.
The United States has done quite well since Sept. 11 in transforming the politico-military landscape of the Middle East, and the trend lines are running in Washington’s favor. Nevertheless, winning a war is not the same thing as having won it. In war, more than anywhere else, Murphy’s Law obtains. Even if all goes well, there might be a Battle of the Bulge out there – some event that would not change the ultimate outcome of the war, but that certainly would come as a nasty surprise.