More on two of Alito’s non-Casey abortion-related decisions:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_10_30-2005_11_05.shtml#1130779540
Alito and Planned Parenthood v. Farmer:
While lots of pundits are pondering Judge Alito’s dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, no one is talking yet about the other Alito abortion opinion: Planned Parenthhod v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 152 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., concurring). The opinion concurred in a judgment striking down New Jersey’s partial birth abortion statute.
Farmer involved a challenge by Planned Parenthood to a 1997 New Jersey statute that prohibited what is popularly known as the “partial birth abortion” procedure. A panel of the Third Circuit consisting of Judges Barry, Garth, and Alito heard argument in the case in November, 1999. On January 14, 2000, while the panel was drafting its majority opinion, the Supreme court granted certiorari in a Nebraska case raising the same issue. The Third Circuit panel held its drafted opinion until the Supreme Court decided the Nebraska case on June 26, 2000. Instead of rewriting the panel opinion along the lines of the Suprme Court’s new decision, Stenberg v. Carhart, Judge Barry simply added a new introductory paragraph to the opinion that she had drafted before the Supreme Court’s decision and published her opinion otherwise “as is.” The first paragraph of Judge Barry’s opinion explains what happened:
The majority opinion which follows was in final form before the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument in the appeal of Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999). The Supreme Court has now issued its opinion in that case, finding Nebraska's "partial birth abortion" statute--a statute nearly identical to the one before this Court--unconstitutional. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000). Because nothing in that opinion is at odds with this Court's opinion; because, in many respects, that opinion confirms and supports this Court's conclusions and, in other respects, goes both further than and not as far as, this opinion; and, because we see no reason for further delay, we issue this opinion without change.
Judge Alito did not join this opinion. Instead, he authored a concurrence reaching the same result by applying Carhart. Here is Judge Alito’s concurrence in its entirely:
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I do not join Judge Barry's opinion, which was never necessary and is now obsolete. That opinion fails to discuss the one authority that dictates the result in this appeal, namely, the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000). Our responsibility as a lower court is to follow and apply controlling Supreme Court precedent. I write briefly to explain why Carhart requires us to affirm the decision of the District Court in this case. This is an appeal by the New Jersey State Legislature from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey holding the New Jersey Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 2A:65A-5 et seq., unconstitutional and permanently enjoining enforcement of the Act. Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F.Supp.2nd 478 (D.N.J.1998). The New Jersey statute closely resembles statutes enacted in recent years in many other states.
On January 14, 2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision in Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1110, 120 S.Ct. 865, 145 L.Ed.2d 725 (2000), which presented the question of the constitutionality of a similar Nebraska statute. The Supreme Court recently held that the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000).
The Court based its decision on two grounds. First, in Part II-A of its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska law is unconstitutional because it lacks an exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. See 120 S.Ct. at 2608-13. Second, in Part II-B of its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose the method most commonly used for second trimester abortions, the "dilation and evacuation" (D & E) method. See 120 S.Ct. at 2612-17.
Under Carhart, the decision of the District Court must be affirmed. First, the New Jersey statute, like its Nebraska counterpart, lacks an exception for the preservation of the health of the mother. Without such an exception, the New Jersey statute is irreconcilable with Part II-A of Carhart.
Second, the Supreme Court's holding in Part II-B of Carhart is also applicable here. As noted, in that portion of its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska statute applied, not only to the "dilation and extraction" or D & X procedure, but also to the more commonly used D & E procedure. The wording of the relevant provisions of the Nebraska statute is nearly identical to that of the New Jersey statute. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Part II-B of its opinion in Carhart must be regarded as controlling in this case.
In light of this interpretation of the New Jersey statute, the Legislature's argument that the plaintiffs lack standing must fail. As noted above, the New Jersey statute must be interpreted, in light of Carhart, as applying to the D & E procedure, and the plaintiff physicians in this case perform that form of abortion. The Legislature's argument that this case is not ripe because the New Jersey statute has not been authoritatively interpreted by the state courts or state enforcement officials must also fail. In view of the interpretation in Carhart, there is no reason to wait for interpretation by state officials or judges.
In a post-Carhart filing, the New Jersey Legislature has urged us to certify questions concerning the interpretation of the New Jersey statute to the state supreme court. In Carhart, however, the Supreme Court of the United States turned down a similar request for certification by the Attorney General of Nebraska. 120 S.Ct. at 2616-17. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to deny certification in Carhart must be regarded as controlling here, both with respect to the Legislature's request for certification and with respect to its closely related argument that the District Court erred in refusing to abstain pursuant to Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).
In conclusion, Carhart compels affirmance of the decision of the District Court.
http://bench.nationalreview.com/archives/081348.asp
Re: Alito and the Blackwell Case
[Edward Whelan 10/31 10:25 AM]
Let me explain more fully why Alito?s vote in a 1995 case involving Medicaid funding of abortion, Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll ( http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/3rd/951107p.html ), has everything to do with a threshold question of administrative law and nothing to do with abortion.
The procedural background to this case is somewhat complicated but ultimately of little bearing:
In 1994, a revised version of the Hyde Amendment provided, for the first time, that Medicaid funds could be expended for abortion when ?the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.? Under Third Circuit precedent that all the panel members recognized to be binding, states, like Pennsylvania, that participated in Medicaid were required to fund those abortions for which federal reimbursement was available.
Implementing this new version of the Hyde Amendment, the director of the Medicaid bureau at HHS sent a letter directive to state Medicaid directors. This letter said that states could impose ?reasonable reporting or documentation requirements ? to assure themselves that an abortion was for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy caused by an act of rape or incest,? but could not impose requirements ?that deny or impede coverage? for such abortions. The letter specifically said that any reporting requirements must provide for a waiver ?if the treating physician certifies that in his or her professional opinion, the patient was unable, for physical or psychological reasons, to comply with the requirement.?
Pennsylvania law did not provide for such a waiver, and providers of Medicaid abortions sued to enjoin operation of the law in the Medicaid context.
The threshold question of administrative law that divided the majority and the dissent was the question whether principles of so-called Chevron deference applied to the HHS action or whether instead so-called Skidmore deference applied. This question, which routinely arose in lots of cases involving review of administrative action, was unsettled at the time, both in the Third Circuit and elsewhere. Justice Scalia has been the most vigorous advocate of an expansive realm for Chevron deference, but his views lost out in the 2001 decision in United States v. Mead ( UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP. | FindLaw ), which, in Scalia?s words, made ?an avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action? by cutting back the realm of cases where Chevron deference applies.
The dissent in the Blackwell case nowhere disputed that if Chevron principles were applicable, the majority opinion was right. Nor did the dissent state that HHS couldn?t adopt the position set forth in the letter directive. It said, rather, that Chevron deference would be accorded to such a position only if HHS adopted it through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
(There?s a second issue in the case involving Pennsylvania?s second-physician certification requirement for cases where abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. Again, the divide between the majority and the dissent turns on Chevron vs. Skidmore.)
In sum, while this case obviously arose in a context involving abortion, the question that divided the majority and the dissent was a general threshold question of administrative law on which Alito was exactly where Scalia was. There is no basis for inferring from this case anything about how Alito would approach other cases involving abortion?other than that Alito would apply the law neutrally and not indulge his own policy preferences (whatever they might be). That is exactly what everyone should want in a Supreme Court justice.
It is tempting, of course, for those of us strongly opposed to abortion to want justices who will have pro-life values and will indulge those values in their decisionmaking. But that is not what proper judging is about, and seeking such justices would be a foolish strategy. The idea that justices may properly impose their own values and policy preferences is precisely what produced cases like Roe. Moreover, given the strong likelihood that the legal elites will always be to the left of the American people, any efforts to legitimate or excuse that illegitimate idea will help to produce similar usurpations in the future.